Graduation model programmes
'Graduation model' programmes share a common logic and basic design features, as described in several contributions to this IDS Bulletin. Extremely poor households are selected to receive a sequenced package of support that includes regular cash transfers for a specified period (usually 12-24 months, sometimes longer), and/or productive assets such as livestock that can generate future streams of income even after the cash transfers stop. Participants are often encouraged to save and apply for small loans, and they may also receive intensive training and coaching.
The theory of change starts from the recognition that a single intervention such as a cash transfer is unlikely to achieve a transformative impact on poor people's livelihoods, but a holistic package of support has the potential to construct a pathway out of poverty towards sustainable selfreliance (Hashemi and Umaira 2011) . Cash transfers are expected to: (1) stabilise household consumption, (2) protect assets against being sold to meet basic needs, and (3) relieve liquidity constraints, allowing households to make productive investments. The promotion of savings and access to microcredit strengthens resilience to shocks and also protects the assets transferred against being sold as a 'coping strategy' following a shock. Finally, training in income-generating activities plus coaching in life-skills is sometimes described as the 'X-factor' of graduation model programmes. The intensive personal attention given to each participant aims to ensure that they make the best possible use of the resources and opportunities they receive.
The claims being made for graduation model programmes are very strong. The approach was pioneered by BRAC in Bangladesh for its Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction (CFPR) programme. According to Samson (this IDS Bulletin) , the CFPR programme 'has lifted hundreds of thousands of households out of extreme poverty'. BRAC itself describes the impacts as 'astonishing' (BRAC 2013: 2) . The concept was subsequently adapted by the Chars Livelihoods Programme (CLP) (see Pritchard, Kenward and Hannan, this IDS Bulletin) and the EEP/Shiree programme (see Risner and Gadhavi, this IDS Bulletin) , both also in Bangladesh. With support from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the Ford Foundation, ten pilot projects were set up to test the replicability of the model in eight countries, including Haiti (see Pain, Vautravers and Descieux, this IDS Bulletin) . Impact evaluations have found that more than three-quarters of participants on these pilot projects achieved locally defined graduation criteria within three years (BRAC 2013: 5) .
Concern Worldwide is also running graduation model pilot projects in Burundi and Rwanda (see Sabates and Devereux, this IDS Bulletin) . National programmes that share features of the graduation model include the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) in Rwanda (see Gahamanyi and Kettlewell, and Sabates-Wheeler et al., this IDS Bulletin) and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia (see Devereux and Ulrichs, this IDS Bulletin) .
So are graduation programmes the latest 'magic bullet' for development?
Different 'graduations'
Michael Samson (this IDS Bulletin) proposes a typology of three distinct approaches to graduation. 'Exogenous exit' describes programmes where participants stop receiving benefits because of a change in their personal characteristics other than their poverty status, or because the programme only runs for a fixed time period. For example, South Africa's Child Support Grant delivers cash transfers until the child 'graduates' into adulthood on their eighteenth birthday. The CLP in Bangladesh and Chemin Lavi Miyo (CLM) in Haiti (see Pain, Vautravers and Descieux, this IDS Bulletin) deliver a sequenced package of support over an 18-20-month project cycle, for each cohort of participants. One limitation of the exogenous approach is that graduation is a 'one-way door': the CLP cannot provide additional support to households after they exit the programme, 'even while recognising that some households will not graduate; and some will slip back under the extreme poverty line' (Pritchard, Kenward and Hannan, this IDS Bulletin) .
'Endogenous graduation' occurs when programmes deliver benefits until participants reach a predefined threshold on key indicators that make them no longer eligible to receive benefits. Since most graduation programmes aim to reduce extreme poverty, this typically requires an individual assessment and a re-targeting process, to determine that the household is no longer extremely poor. 
Why is graduation controversial?
Should graduation be seen as part of the social protection agenda? There is no consensus on this, partly because there is no agreed definition of social protection. One position is that social protection is essentially about safety nets and risk management ('protecting' people against shocks and risks), while another perspective is that social protection should support poor people's efforts to escape deprivation and contribute to economic growth ('promoting' people out of poverty). Graduation sits uncomfortably alongside the former conceptualisation, but is fully aligned with the latter.
At the conceptual level, graduation programmes might appear to blur the boundaries between social protection and broader development programming. Social protection has sometimes been accused of overstepping its mandate, given its origins in social welfare thinking. This is partly due to a misconception. In the case of 'transformative social protection' (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004) , for instance, our argument was not that the definition of social protection should be extended to incorporate complementary development programmes and policies, but that many mainstream social protection instruments -such as school feeding and public works programmes -can be designed progressively to deliver on a range of impacts, including economic ones. If it is well designed and sensitively implemented, social protection can support income generation ('promotion') as well as empowerment ('transformation'), while simultaneously delivering on its core functions of social assistance ('protection') and social insurance ('prevention') . Kidd (2013: 3) , graduation epitomises 'a neoliberal vision of social policy… The desire by some governments to "graduate" people from poor relief schemes is directly related to their perception of such schemes as "handouts"'. More generally, Reddy (2013) is sceptical about microinterventions and 'technofixes' that operate in isolation of their macro-context, and that focus on ameliorating poverty rather than enabling genuine socioeconomic transformation. To the extent that graduation programmes fit this description, they are susceptible to the criticism sometimes made against other forms of social protection: that they deliver a nominal level of assistance to the poorest individuals, without challenging -and possibly even reinforcing -the structural drivers of poverty and inequality in that society.
Does graduation work?
Assessing whether a household has graduated requires devising indicators that reflect the programme's theory of change and measuring those indicators when the programme starts (at baseline) and at least once thereafter (midline, endline and/or follow-up). To establish causalityto demonstrate that any observed changes can be attributed to the programme -data on the same indicators should also be collected from a control group of individuals or households with similar characteristics to participants. Ideally, a panel of participants and non-participants (controls) would be tracked for several years, even post-exit, to assess whether graduates retain their gains and are more resilient if they face shocks. Although rigorous impact evaluations following these 'randomised controlled trial' protocols have been conducted for a few graduation programmes, the evidence base to date is limited, because graduation model programmes are relatively new and because monitoring and evaluation often stop when a programme cycle ends or when a participant graduates.
Several articles in this IDS Bulletin report on evaluation findings, though not all included a control group in their monitoring and evaluation systems, so causation can only be inferred for some cases. This section reviews the empirical evidence presented in the articles that follow this Introduction, on the main outcome indicators that graduation programmes aim to influencegraduation rates, household incomes, asset ownership, savings, food security and empowerment.
Graduation rates
Superficially, graduation rates might seem straightforward to quantify: how many households are no longer poor when they leave the programme? In practice, this calculation is much more complex. Firstly, most graduation programmes aim to lift people out of 'extreme poverty', not poverty per se -so most graduates remain objectively poor -and extreme poverty is defined differently in different contexts. Secondly, graduation rates are highly sensitive to the indicators that are selected and the benchmarks that define success. For example, an impressive 85 per cent of households on the Chars Livelihoods Programme (CLP-2) were assessed as having graduated after receiving 18-20 months of support. However, a sensitivity analysis reveals how dramatically this figure changes if the graduation threshold -which was (arbitrarily) set at achieving at least six out of ten graduation criteria -is adjusted: 65 per cent of households achieved 7/10 criteria, 37 per cent achieved 8/10 criteria, but only 2 Although their incomes declined slightly thereafter, they remained at almost double their baseline level, two years after graduation. However, the proportion of women earning more than US$1/day only rose from 7 per cent to 18 per cent over this period -most remained extremely poor. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), by contrast, the proportion of women whose income exceeded US$1/day increased from 5 per cent to 82 per cent between baseline and two years after graduation (McIlvaine et al., this IDS Bulletin) . In Bangladesh, two years after joining the CFPR programme, former participants earned per capita incomes that were 42 per cent higher in real terms. Even after controlling for rising incomes among control group households, the attributable programme impact was a 24 per cent increase in real per capita incomes (Samson, this IDS Bulletin).
Assets
Productive assets are transferred as grants on many graduation programmes, very often in the form of livestock -cattle, goats, poultry (Kim and Sumberg, this IDS Bulletin) . Participants also use their incremental income to acquire consumer goods and productive assets. Analysing non-land productive assets owned by CFPR programme participants in Bangladesh, Samson (this IDS Bulletin) finds that 'gross assets' increased tenfold within two years of joining the programme. Excluding assets transferred by the CFPR programme and also controlling for increased asset ownership by control group households, 'net assets' owned by CFPR households still increased by 43 per cent -a significant attributable programme impact. 
Food security
Cash transfers improve food security in agrarian communities in two ways: by financing food purchases and by financing investment in food production. 
Empowerment
Graduation programmes often aim to promote social inclusion and empowerment. In Rwanda, Concern's Graduation Programme led to increased participation by poor participants in social ceremonies and community activities, because their self-confidence and self-esteem improved. They no longer needed to beg for help from neighbours, they could afford decent clothes to attend village meetings and they could make financial contributions when required. A statistically significant improvement between baseline and follow-up surveys was recorded on a subjective question about whether participants felt respected by their community (Sabates and Devereux, this IDS Bulletin). For similar reasons, cash transfers in Ghana and Lesotho were found 'to strengthen informal social protection systems and risk-sharing arrangements ' (Daidone et al., this IDS Bulletin) .
For socially disadvantaged groups, including women in many contexts, the causes of deprivation are sociocultural as much as economic. Several graduation programmes target women, even in male-headed households, in an attempt 'to foster women's empowerment to counter some perceived negative aspects of traditional male-dominated culture' (Pritchard, 
Programme-level
The extent to which a graduation programme can move people out of (extreme) poverty sustainably depends to a large extent on how well the programme is designed and delivered. Programme-level drivers of graduation outcomes include the amount of support provided and for how long, which people are selected into graduation programmes, how accurately progress towards graduation is monitored, and which assets are transferred to participants. Since these basic design features can all be adjusted by programme implementers, there are potentially important lessons to be learned from reviewing actual case study experiences.
Value and duration of support
The more resources are transferred to resourceconstrained households, the more likely they are to graduate -bigger transfers equal bigger impacts. Design choices that constrain graduation potential include delivering too few resources (e.g. setting a cash transfer level at the value of a basic food basket, leaving no surplus for investment), not calibrating transfers by household size (so larger households receive less per person), and failing to adjust transfers regularly to account for inflation (so their real value fluctuates seasonally and declines over time 
Targeting
Samson (this IDS Bulletin) notes that targeting is a major challenge that complicates the achievement of developmental objectives, including graduation. Most graduation programmes require rigorous forms of targeting, aiming to reach the poorest using communitybased approaches or other mechanisms, with high direct and indirect costs that limit the coverage and scope of these interventions. Under-coverage of the poorest and most vulnerable characterises many national programmes as well as small-scale NGO projects. Also, as Daidone et al. (this IDS Bulletin) point out, programme implementers should be aware that the demographics of target groups have implications for whether graduation at scale is a realistic and achievable goal. A target group dominated by young households with working adults has greater potential to graduate than a target group dominated by older persons and the chronically ill.
Sabates-Wheeler et al. (this IDS Bulletin) raise two pertinent targeting and graduation issues:
(1) the difficulty of separating the poor from the non-poor and ranking them accurately; and (2) the sensitivity of eligibility criteria, and thus graduation thresholds, to different targeting modalities. Identification of the poor/non-poor, or eligible/non-eligible, enables more accurate monitoring of changes in wellbeing, and graduation trajectories. Their analysis illustrates how difficult it is to identify the poor and the non-poor, and how inclusion of households into social programmes is determined by which coverage levels are set -which is typically a political choice. Targeting and graduation are different sides of the same coin, as the criteria for one have implications for the other. For instance, in Rwanda, eligibility for the VUP is defined by being classified in the bottom two wealth categories, while graduation (or exit) is defined by moving out of these categories. It follows that monitoring poverty eligibility criteria over time also enables monitoring of graduation trajectories. The article recommends:
(1) combining participatory targeting methods with more objective but easily verifiable indicators as a way to triangulate the wealth ranking; and (2) tracking household welfare over time so that graduation is not defined merely as the opposite of programme inclusion, but also contains some indicators of long-term livelihood improvement.
Monitoring
Closely related to targeting are challenges of monitoring. As noted by Risner and Gadhavi (this IDS Bulletin), 'to operationalise a 100 per cent graduation [target] creates an imperative for programmes to focus on all of their beneficiaries, in particular the very poorest'. A requirement to focus on, and thus monitor, the majority of programme participants has significant implications for monitoring, data requirements, and by association the setting up of management and monitoring systems. If a programme is to be effective, systems must be in place to identify, track and evaluate changes to households over time. Taken seriously, this has implications for programme costs. Using the example of EEP/Shiree in Bangladesh, Risner and Gadhavi illustrate a successful example of how to build a system that can track the current status of all programme participants. They stress the importance of collecting 'real-time' and up-to-date census-level information that can enable adaptation of interventions for vulnerable households in a timely way. The method of realtime data collection is facilitated with a combination of smartphones and internet connectivity. While challenging and costly, the evidence emerging from EEP/Shiree shows that this kind of intensive monitoring can contribute to positive improvements in all poor people's livelihoods.
Of course, if we are to track and understand livelihood pathways, regular monitoring of 'graduation' indicators is critical. This will allow (1) accurate targeting and graduation numbers and (2) response in a timely and appropriate way to support livelihoods that may be 'failing' or facing shocks. This is a data-intensive exercise with high costs and requires high technical capacity and ability to respond. It is an aspirational agenda that appears to be working in the case of EEP/Shiree. Whether such heavy monitoring can work at scale is a question that can only be answered once tested. More 'realtime' monitoring would be welcome in any programmes attempting to support graduation.
'Asset-ness'
A defining feature of most graduation programmes is that they transfer assets to poor households. The theory of change is rarely elaborated, but essentially turns on an assumption that productive assets will generate future streams of income, so giving relevant assets to poor people will make them less poor both immediately and in the future, leading to 'asset-based graduation' (Sumberg and Lankoande 2013) .
On many graduation programmes, livestock are the most popular assets transferred. In Bangladesh, 98 per cent of participants on the CLP's Asset Transfer Project chose cattle (Pritchard, Kenward and Hannan, this IDS Bulletin). But Kim and Sumberg (this IDS Bulletin) remind us that assets are highly differentiated. Livestock, for instance, come in different species, sexes, breeds and ages. Returns to assets depend on their intrinsic characteristics (their 'asset-ness'), on the characteristics (or initial conditions) of their owners, on the contexts (agro-ecological, institutional, etc.) in which they are used, and on how well they are maintained or managed.
Some assets are riskier than others. One graduation project in Pakistan introduced a breed of goats that was not well adapted to the arid local climate, and many goats starved (BRAC 2013) . Another graduation pilot project in Honduras transferred chickens as a productive asset, most of which died during a poultry disease outbreak, leaving participants worse off on several indicators than before (Goldberg 2014). Such perverse outcomes could be avoided with risk assessments and adequate preparatory measures. We agree with Pain, Vautravers and Descieux (this IDS Bulletin) , that 'when transferring a "livelihood asset" to extremely poor people it is essential that support systems are in place to make sure they can utilise this. For instance, transferring animals as a livelihood asset, without ensuring there is a functioning veterinary service or that the beneficiaries have the capacity to manage the animals or access these services can lead to problems.'
Market-level
Local economies benefit directly and through multiplier effects from the injection of cash and other resources that accompany graduation programmes, but weak local economies can also limit the impacts. Most graduation programmes are implemented in poor rural communities, often characterised by thin markets and infrastructure deficits. In such contexts, the surge in demand from cash transfers might merely fuel price inflation, and the surge in supply of traded commodities produced by asset transfers and income-generating activities could overwhelm local markets. In Ethiopia, for example, 'Household Asset-Building Packages', designed to generate secondary sources of income, led to over-supply and collapse in prices for some commodities, 'because of mass production by many farmers at the same time' (Devereux et al. 2014: 21) .
It follows that, since graduation requires earning independent livelihoods, 'sustainable graduation is not a credible promise in the absence of conducive market conditions ' (Daidone et al., this IDS Bulletin) . As a case in point, Daidone et al. found evidence that the extent to which cash transfers in rural Kenya were invested in family farms -through the purchase of fertiliser, seeds and other agricultural inputs -was higher in districts with well-developed markets for land, livestock and labour. Pain, Vautravers and Descieux (this IDS Bulletin) conclude that the promotion of new livelihood activities as part of graduation packages should be implemented with caution: 'a comprehensive value chain analysis needs to be undertaken beforehand, and the appropriateness of the intervention be checked'.
An emerging debate concerns the relationship between graduation programmes and labour markets. Many graduation programmes aim to increase returns to self-employment, and to alleviate dependence on unreliable and exploitative informal labour markets. Participants in rural areas tend to reallocate their labour, away from casual agricultural wage employment towards their own farms and micro-enterprises. One evaluation of BRAC's CFPR programme found that the proportion of participants who were fully self-employed rose from 30 per cent to 47 per cent, while those who depended entirely on wage labour fell from 26 per cent to 6 per cent, between joining the programme and two years after leaving it (BRAC 2013).
However, some have questioned this focus on promoting self-employment as a pathway to graduation, rather than assisting participants to find 'real jobs' with regular wages and decent working conditions. For one thing, graduation programmes often encourage participants to take loans to finance their micro-enterprises, but the microfinance literature has confirmed that for poor people, taking on debt can be highly risky. Daidone et al. (this IDS Bulletin) found that many cash transfer recipients in rural Africa are wary even of subsidised loans, for this reason: 'households remain risk averse and reluctant to take advantage of their greater access to credit'. This highlights a fundamental contradiction between two competing objectives of social protection programmes -to protect poor people against risks (the safety net function) and to encourage poor people to take risks (the economic growth function).
McCord and Slater (this IDS Bulletin) argue that the preoccupation with tackling supply-side constraints in the labour market, by attempting to turn the recipients of social transfers into microentrepreneurs, ignores the more fundamental demand-side constraints. For McCord and Slater, sustainable graduation would be better achieved by moving poor people into 'sustainable employment', which they define as 'employment which is ongoing and secure; offers adequate remuneration and working conditions; and is provided by the economy rather than external interventions (such as aid)'. Addressing the barriers to sustainable employment entails a more ambitious agenda of job creation, and improving the quality of available employment opportunities -including the provision of social security benefits.
Political-level
Political support for graduation programmes can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, highlevel endorsement could be instrumental in leveraging resources from Ministries of Finance, which might otherwise be reluctant to allocate public expenditures to social programmes that are often located in weak government departments. On the other hand, political support is often accompanied by political pressure to demonstrate success and value for money, not only from politicians but also from donor agencies when these programmes are substantially financed out of development assistance budgets.
As Devereux and Ulrichs (this IDS Bulletin) argue, introducing graduation as an objective can compromise social protection programmes, if this shifts perceptions of such interventions away from welfarist social assistance for vulnerable groups, towards livelihood promotion for economically active groups. As noted above, the danger is that social protection policies will be distracted from their primary objective of guaranteeing income security for all against risks and shocks, and will be harnessed instead to the national poverty reduction agenda, which is driven by targets that require large numbers of people to graduate out of poverty and exit these programmes. One development partner in Rwanda (quoted by Devereux and Ulrichs) summed it up neatly: 'Politically, graduation makes social protection palatable.'
In Ethiopia, graduation targets have been interpreted as quotas by PSNP officials, and pressure to achieve them may have resulted in substantial premature graduation. In Rwanda, the fact that being classified as poor is associated with eligibility for programme benefits has distorted the community-based targeting process (see Sabates-Wheeler et al., this IDS Bulletin) .
Stakeholders have divergent opinions on programme participants' attitudes to graduation.
A government official in Rwanda asserted that: 'Most people do want to graduate', but a researcher in Ethiopia disagreed: 'Nobody wants to graduate' (quoted in Devereux and Ulrichs, this IDS Bulletin) . One area of broad consensus concerns the need for a 'twin-track' approach, with a social safety net being put in place for poor and vulnerable people who cannot work, and graduation programmes being designed only for a subset of poor people -the new generation safety net in Ethiopia being an example of this. In some countries, though, political enthusiasm for graduation is diverting social protection programming and budgets towards groups perceived as having 'graduation potential'.
Conclusion
As poverty reduction policies and ambitions for holistic social protection systems continue to evolve, so too should our aspirations for graduation. Reflecting on the articles in this IDS Bulletin, it is clear that the people who design graduation model programmes understand that poverty is too complex to be solved with a single instrument such as cash transfers. Graduation programmes strive to enhance livelihoods and strengthen resilience by providing integrated packages of support -cash, productive assets, access to financial services, training and coaching -in a holistic effort to address the wide spectrum of resource deficits that keep people trapped in poverty and vulnerability.
This does not mean that the perfect package has yet been designed. We do not yet understand the optimal combinations of support for people in different contexts, or the best ways to build linkages and maximise synergies across complementary sectoral interventions. The assumption of a smooth linear pathway out of poverty might also seem naïve, as it overlooks the unpredictable and often erratic nature of poor people's livelihood trajectories.
Graduation programmes focus on moving people out of extreme poverty as quickly as possible, making little effort to challenge the structural conditions that are the fundamental drivers of poverty and vulnerability. This is partly because they are expensive and require multi-annual spending commitments, but governments and donors are under increasing pressure to show results fast. Realistic expectations and time frames for graduation are, therefore, often sacrificed to the imperatives of speed and valuefor-money calculations. For these reasons, most programmes still fail to bolster livelihoods adequately for the long run -that is, for sustainable, intergenerational graduation rather than simply for programme exit.
Nonetheless, the achievements of graduation programmes are impressive. They might not be a 'magic bullet' and they should not be seen as a substitute for the core social protection functions of social assistance and social insurance, but they offer a fresh approach to tackling poverty and vulnerability. At a time when social protection is moving towards integrated systems and strengthening cross-sectoral linkages with complementary social and economic policies, graduation programmes add real value to efforts to build more secure, sustainable and resilient livelihoods. 
